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I. INTRODUCTION
Crystal Hilton hated school.' The other kids teased and taunted her; they
spread rumors behind her back and ridiculed her to her face.2 Crystal
1. See Crystal Hilton, Living with HIV and Conquering It, in THE TIE THAT BINDS:
SOUTH CAROLINA AT THE CROSS ROADS: HIV/AIDS AMONG CHILDREN AND YOUTH
12, 14 (McLendon et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.schivaidscouncil.org
/files/TTBJan08G.pdf (explaining the mockery, social exclusion, and embarrassment
Hilton experienced as an HIV-positive student in South Carolina).
2. See id. at 12 (describing how friends excluded her upon discovering her HIV
status).
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struggled to explain the abuse to her grandmother, asking,
[H]ow could I tell her that I cried myself to sleep... that I hated going
to school? How could I tell her that the students were tormenting and
teasing me because of my illness? How could I tell her that I hated what
I saw in the mirror? How could I tell her the HIV was ruining my life?
3
Crystal is not your classic bully victim. 4 Children and adults at Crystal's
South Carolina high school targeted her because she is HIV-positive.5 In
2003, the school expelled Crystal, and both Crystal and her grandmother
suspect that fear of HIV drove the decision, not a legitimate rationale.
6
Crystal's experience is not unique. HIV-positive school children
throughout the United States report instances of stigmatization and
harassment when people at their schools discover their HIV status.
7
However, Crystal's rights as a public school student in South Carolina
differ from the rights of HIV-positive students in other states.8 South
Carolina law requires the state Department of Health and Environmental
Control ("DHEC") to report the identities of HIV-positive public school
students to certain school officials. 9 In South Carolina, Crystal and her
family do not decide whether to disclose her status to people at her school
-the state decides for them.'0
This Comment argues that South Carolina's reporting requirement
violates HIV-positive students' constitutional right to privacy. 1 Courts
should hold that the right to privacy in personal matters encompasses the
3. See id. at 13-14 (explaining that Hilton's shame made it difficult to disclose the
social and psychological effects of the abuse).
4. See REBECCA C. JONES, LIVING wiTH HIV/AIDS: STUDENTS TELL THEIR
STORIES OF STIGMA, COURAGE, AND RESILIENCE 36 (2006) (noting the complexity of
the social issues faced by HIV-positive students).
5. See Hilton, supra note 1, at 13 (describing how stigmatization by teenagers and
adults at her school "almost destroyed" her).
6. See id. (explaining that Hilton never returned to a different school after being
expelled because she feared that she would again encounter constant harassment due to
her HIV status).
7. See generally JONES, supra note 4, at 2-32 (recalling the personal stories of
nine students who reported disparate treatment in their schools as a result of their HIV-
positive status).
8. See Staff of Volume 13, State Statutes Dealing with HIV and AIDS: A
Comprehensive State-by-State Summary (2004 Edition), 13 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 468-70
(2004).
9. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135(e) (2008) (requiring the DHEC to notify the
superintendant and school nurse at the students' schools if a student tests positive for
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS")).
10. See id. (mandating that the identities of all students who test positive for
HIV/AIDS be reported to school officials, regardless of whether the student consents to
the disclosure).
11. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the privacy interest in H1V status outweighs
the state public health interest in mandatory disclosure).
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right to non-disclosure of one's HIV status, and that one's status as a public
school student does not dilute this right.12 South Carolina should also
recognize that the requirement impedes HIV prevention policy by
discouraging students from receiving HIV tests and undermining the use of
universal precautions in public schools.'
3
Part II of this Comment discusses HIV/AIDS and its impact on
adolescents, South Carolina's reporting requirement, and the development
of privacy jurisprudence.14 Part III argues that the HIV status reporting
requirement violates the right to non-disclosure of one's HIV status that is
encompassed by the constitutional right to privacy in personal matters.
15
Part IV concludes that South Carolina must eliminate the reporting
requirement in order to protect students' privacy rights and achieve the
state's public health goals. 16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adolescents, Stigma and HIV/AIDS in the United States
As of 2003, HIV/AIDS infected approximately 1.1 million people in the
United States, with an estimated 56,300 new HIV infections occurring in
2006.17 Twenty-five percent of those infected are currently unaware of
their positive status.1 8
In August 2008, a study released by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention ("CDC") and the Journal of the American Medical Association
("JAMA") revealed that the United States' annual HIV infection rate is
12. See infra Part III.A.2 (maintaining that public school student status does not
affect the privacy expectation in one's HIV status).
13. See infra Part III.C.6 (explaining that youths refrain from accessing HIV tests if
they doubt the results' confidentiality).
14. See infra Part II (discussing HIV and adolescent issues, the controversy
surrounding the reporting requirement, and the emergence of the right to privacy in
personal matters).
15. See infra Part III (arguing that the right to privacy encompasses a right to non-
disclosure of personal information and that HIV-positive students' privacy interest in
their HIV status outweighs the state interest in disclosure of status).
16. See infra Part IV (concluding that lawmakers or courts must void the
requirement because it undermines HIV/AIDS prevention).
17. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-2 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/
factsheets/PDF/us.pdf [hereinafter HIV/AIDS] (reporting that men who have sex with
men, African-Americans, and twenty-five to thirty-four year olds experience the most
H1V/AIDS diagnoses).
18. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ESTIMATES OF NEW HIV
INFECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov
/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/factsheets/pdf/incidence.pdf (promoting routine
testing to increase awareness and prevent the transmission of HIV).
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forty percent higher than previously reported.' 9 New testing technology
revealed the higher rate, which indicates that the HIV/AIDS epidemic
constitutes a greater national crisis than was previously understood. 20 In
response to the new data, HIV/AIDS activists and medical professionals
have called for drastically increased efforts in prevention, HIV testing,
counseling, and outreach to at-risk groups. 2' The CDC specifically
champions routine HIV testing as an intrinsic, highly effective tool of a
successful HIV prevention program.22
Adolescents constitute a critical target group for HIV prevention efforts
because young people between the ages of thirteen to twenty-four
represented fifteen percent of new HIV infections in 2006.23 HIV
especially threatens this age group due to risk factors particular to youths:
early sexual initiation, higher rates of sexually transmitted diseases
("STDs"), substance abuse that leads to high-risk behavior, and decreased
awareness of HIV susceptibility and prevention methods.2 Consequently,
the CDC specifically recommends routine HIV testing to prevent the
spread of HIV among adolescents.
Adolescent hesitance to undergo HIV testing confounds the CDC's goal
of routine testing.26  This hesitance stems from adolescents' fear of
19. See Marilyn Chase, CDC Criticized for Delays in Release of AIDS Data:
Activists Say Chance Was Lost to Counter Impact of More Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
2008, at A3 (discussing the surprised reaction of the public to the CDC and JAMA
study).
20. See Lawrence K. Altman, H.I.V. Study Finds Rate 40% Higher than Estimated,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at Al (noting that the new statistics alarm doctors and
activists involved in HIV/AIDS prevention because the statistics indicate that
prevention efforts have fallen short in curbing the spread of HIV).
21. See Chase, supra note 19 (reporting disappointment in the decrease in resources
dedicated to prevention initiatives).
22. See BERNARD A. BRANSON ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CDC,
REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIV TESTING OF ADULTS, ADOLESCENTS, AND
PREGNANT WOMEN IN HEALTH-CARE SETTINGS 4 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5514al.htm (explaining that people's
widespread unawareness of their risk for HIV infection necessitates routine, universal
testing instead of risk-based testing).
23. See HIV/AIDS, supra note 17, at 2 (reporting that the highest rate of newly
diagnosed H1V infection was split between twenty-five to thirty-four year olds and
thirty-five to forty-four year olds in 2006).
24. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS AMONG YOUTH
2-3 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets
/PDF/youth.pdf (noting the difficulties in preventing transmission among youth and
advocating programs specifically designed to teach young people about the dangers of
HIV/AIDS and methods of prevention).
25. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 7 (revising testing recommendations for
adolescents and adults to address the heightened need for prevention and early
detection of HIV).
26. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, AIDS and Adolescents, 7 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 280, 285 (2004) (advocating for adolescent consent to disclosure and arguing
that the number of reported adolescent HIV cases is artificially low due to testing
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indiscreet disclosure of their sexual health information. 7 Adolescents
exhibit particular concern for maintaining the confidentiality of their sexual
health information because of the stigma surrounding teen pregnancy,
abortion, and STDs.2 8  Due to this stigma, doubts as to confidentiality
prevent adolescents from procuring sexual health care.2 9 Ensuring strict
confidentiality of HIV test results is therefore essential to implementing the
routine testing of adolescents.30
The experiences of HIV-positive students legitimate youths' fear of
disclosure and subsequent stigmatization. 3  Negative attitudes toward
individuals living with HIV/AIDS continue to pervade society and infiltrate
school systems.32 Students who publicly disclose their HIV status risk
humiliation and isolation at school.33 Students who disclose their status to
a limited number of school authorities chance indiscreet breaches of
confidentiality that expose them to stigmatization.34  These harsh
consequences highlight the immense need for maintaining the
confidentiality of adolescents' HIV status.35
The Supreme Court recognizes the need to protect individuals with
HIV/AIDS from discrimination.36 Its holding in Bragdon v. Abbott extends
the Americans with Disabilities Act's ("ADA") definition of "physical
aversion which results, partially, from mandatory, non-consensual disclosures, such as
to an adolescent's parents).
27. See id. at 289 (contending that doubts as to confidentiality often deter
adolescents from accessing health care).
28. See AIDS ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, FINDING HIV-
POSITIVE YOUTH AND BRINGING THEM INTO CARE 16 (2005) (arguing that adolescents'
awareness of their vulnerability to harassment necessitates strong assurances of
confidentiality in providing HIV care).
29. See id. (explaining how assurances of confidentiality increase youths'
willingness to speak candidly about sexuality).
30. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 291 (describing how a lack of privacy
protections for adolescents thwarts prevention goals).
31. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 4, at 12 (detailing the social repercussions one
child with AIDS experienced at school, such as other children running away from him
and not wanting to use the water fountain after him).
32. See Anne L. Bryant, Preface to REBECCA C. JONES, LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS:
STUDENTS TELL THEIR STORIES OF STIGMA, COURAGE, AND RESILIENCE iv, v (2006)
(explaining how the parents of HIV-positive students fear for their children's safety at
school).
33. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 4, at 19-20 (detailing how extreme harassment
caused one HIV-positive student to transfer schools).
34. See id. at 36 (describing how one mother told her son's status to a school nurse
and later heard others gossiping about him).
35. See id. (calling on schools to respect students' privacy by keeping student
health records confidential).
36. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998) (holding that an HIV-positive
woman who was denied dental treatment qualified as disabled under the ADA because
H1V constitutes a physical impairment that limits the major life activity of
reproduction).
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impairment" to include HIV infection.37 The ADA consequently protects
people with HIV/AIDS as "disabled" upon a showing that their status limits
a major life activity.38 Unfortunately, an inability to meet this burden
operates to exclude many HIV-positive individuals from ADA protection,
leaving discrimination against such individuals to continue unchecked post-
Bragdon.
39
B. South Carolina's Reporting Requirement
South Carolina's reporting requirement compels the DHEC to notify a
school's superintendant and nurse if a minor student has HIV or AIDS.4°
South Carolina law requires all health professionals who diagnose or treat
an STD to report the name, date of birth, and address of the patient to the
DHEC.4 1 Upon receiving a report that a minor who attends public school
has HIV or AIDS, the DHEC must report the minor's name and medical
status to the minor's school superintendent and nurse.42 These officials
may disclose the information to other personnel who have "a bona fide
need to know. 43  Strict confidentiality binds all persons receiving the
information, and violations may result in criminal and civil liability.
44
The reporting requirement mandates a level of HIV/AIDS disclosure
unauthorized in most other states.45 This level of disclosure concerned
South Carolina lawmakers, and in January 2008, legislators proposed a new
bill voiding the current reporting requirement and instead mandating: (1)
that school officials report to the DHEC any incidents of blood or bodily
37. See id. at 637 (finding that every stage of HIV infection meets the statutory
definition of "physical impairment").
38. See id. at 638 (holding that reproduction is one major life activity among many
that may be substantially limited by HIV).
39. See Scott Thompson, Abbott, AIDS, and the ADA: Why a Per Se Disability
Rule for HIV/AIDS is Both Just and a Must, 15 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2
(2008) (arguing that because of the difficulty proving limitations of major life
activities, HIV should be classified as a per se disability to ensure that those infected
get ADA protection).
40. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135(e) (2008) (mandating DHEC reporting of
HIV-postitive minors to school authorities because STDs constitute a threat to public
health).
41. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-21(C)(1) (2008) (delineating the process for
reporting STDs to the DHEC).
42. See § 44-29-135(e) (requiring reporting to public school officials solely in the
case of minors infected with HIV/AIDS).
43. See 6l-21(G)(3).
44. See 61-21(H)(2); see also S.C. CODE ANN § 44-1-15061-21(H)(2) (2008)
(noting that breaches of confidentiality by persons with a "need to know" may be
penalized by up to $200 in criminal fines, thirty days imprisonment, or $1000 per day
of violation in civil penalties).
45. See Staff of Volume 13, supra note 8, at 7, 20, 173, 311, 333, 470 (reporting
nonconsensual school notification requirements in only six states, including South
Carolina, as of 2004).
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fluid exposure that occur between students at school or school-sponsored
events, and (2) that schools adopt the CDC-recommended universal
precautions for preventing blood-borne disease exposure.46 The bill's
sponsors highlighted federal privacy law that rendered the current reporting
requirement useless since the information could not be conveyed to other
parties, and South Carolina AIDS activists emphasized the necessity of
voiding the law in order to promote HIV testing of adolescents.
47
Although the General Assembly passed the bill in June 2008, Governor
Mark Sanford vetoed it, and the House sustained the veto.48 Governor
Sanford reasoned that the students' health and safety interests required
lawmakers to add, instead of delete, highly contagious, deadly diseases to
the notification list.49 He also condemned federal disclosure prohibitions as
"misguided principle[s]" not to be codified at the state level. 50  The
reporting requirement therefore remains operative, leaving student privacy
and HIV testing concerns unaddressed.51
C. The Constitutional Right to Privacy in Personal Matters: A Limitation
on the State's Authority to Regulate Public Health
1. State Public Health Regulation and the Emergence of a Constitutional
Right to Privacy
States retain the authority to enact public health regulations under the
Tenth Amendment. 52  The Supreme Court recognizes this authority and
holds that states may restrict individual liberty in the interest of public
46. See S. 970, 117th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 1, 2, 4 (S.C. 2008) (mandating
that records of bloodborne diseases be kept strictly confidential except when released
consensually, for anonymous statistical purposes, to enforce other disease-control
regulations, to medical personnel "to protect the health or life of any person," or if the
person diagnosed is a minor and a report must be made under the Child Protection Act
of 1977).
47. See Sponsors of South Carolina Bill that Would Modify Regulations
Concerning HIV-Positive Students Will Attempt to Override Veto, KAISER DAILY
HTV/AIDS REPORT, June 16, 2008, available at http://www.kaisemetwork.org
/dailyreports/rep index.cfm?hint=1 &DR ID=52745 [hereinafter Sponsors] (noting
advocates' contention that the law's effect of discouraging testing could lead to the
continued prevalence of HIV, especially in the African-American community).
48. See STATENET, 2007 BILL TRACKING SC S.B. 970, 1-2 (2008).
49. See 88 S.C. S. JOUR., 2008 Reg. Sess. (June 25, 2008) (quoting Gov. Sanford's
letter explaining his concern that elimination of the requirement would increase the risk
to students).
50. See id. (quoting Gov. Sanford's letter arguing that failure to disclose the status
of HIV-positive students infringes upon the rights of other students).
51. See Associated Press, Lawmakers Annul 15 of Sanford's 20 Vetoes in One Day,
AUGUSTA CHRON., June 26, 2008, at B09 (reporting that lawmakers upheld the veto
because they believed that school nurses should know students' HIV status).
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the states all powers not prohibited or
delegated to the federal government).
WHEN STUDENTS TEST POSITIVE
health, safety, and welfare.53 However, a reasonableness requirement
limits state regulations, and states cannot enact public health measures that
unreasonably infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.54
The Constitution protects the right to privacy and therefore limits state
health regulation.5 5 The Supreme Court reasons that a fundamental right to
privacy emanates from the Bill of Rights, and that many Bill of Rights
provisions presume this right, even though the Constitution does not
explicitly grant it.56 The ambiguous nature of the right to privacy causes it
to evolve incrementally, with the Court slowly extending its scope to
encompass matters such as procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and child education.
57
The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade evinces that the privacy right does
not bar state regulation. 58  States may restrict Court-recognized privacy
rights if the regulations meet the applicable standard of scrutiny.5 9 The
Supreme Court initially asserted strict scrutiny as the standard for privacy
cases. However, subsequent Court analyses do not consistently apply this
standard, and the Court's privacy decisions often neglect to state explicitly
the applicable standard of review.61
2. Whalen v. Roe: The Right to Privacy in Personal Matters
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether non-
disclosure of one's HIV test results falls within the constitutional right to
53. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-26 (1905) (affirming state
police power to enact health laws and holding that individual rights are subject to
reasonable restraints).
54. See id at 30-31, 39 (upholding a statute that required smallpox vaccinations
because it was a reasonable, effective health law and therefore did not
unconstitutionally restrict liberty).
55. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (striking down a Texas
statute that outlawed non-therapeutic abortion because the law violated the
constitutional right to privacy).
56. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that
penumbras emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
create protected zones of privacy because these amendments presuppose the right of
privacy).
57. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (explaining the many constitutional bases for the
privacy right and its gradual extension via jurisprudence).
58. See id. at 154 (acknowledging that some state regulation of abortion is
permissible once the state interest in the pregnancy becomes sufficient to sustain
regulation, despite the privacy right to an abortion).
59. See id. at 154-55 (allowing state regulation of abortion when the state interest
becomes sufficiently compelling).
60. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that the right to privacy in marriage
is a fundamental constitutional right).
61. Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (using strict scrutiny to strike down Texas's
abortion statute), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (failing to state the
level of scrutiny used in finding Texas' anti-sodomy law unconstitutional).
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62privacy. However, the Court's Whalen v. Roe decision provides a general
framework for analyzing privacy issues concerning medical disclosures,
and circuit courts use this precedent in cases addressing the legal
implications of disclosing a person's HIV status.63
The Whalen Court considered a statute requiring centralized state
reporting of a patient's name if the patient received certain medical
prescriptions. 64 The state enacted the statute to control the illegitimate use
of prescription drugs.65 The appellees claimed the law unconstitutionally
violated their right to privacy because the reporting requirement
individually identified them as users of the drugs, disclosure of this data
could lead to stigmatization as "drug addicts," and some persons in need of
these medications would decline treatment out of fear of disclosure and
stigmatization.66 The Court upheld the statute because the state has a "vital
interest" in ensuring that potentially dangerous medications are properly
distributed.67  Furthermore, the state's security measures sufficiently
minimized disclosure risks.68
The Whalen decision notably expanded the scope of the privacy right to
encompass a right to privacy in personal matters. 69 The Court drew its
conclusion in Whalen by analyzing the statute in light of two distinct
privacy interests: (1) the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
and (2) the interest in maintaining independence when making critical
62. See Nicole Kamm, HIV Reporting in California: By Name or By Number?, 25
J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 545, 560-61 (2005) (noting that while the Supreme
Court has yet to address whether mandatory, name-based HIV reporting schemes
implicate the privacy right, the Court has considered whether related medical
situations, such as mandating vaccinations and disclosing the names and addresses of
persons taking certain prescriptions, implicate privacy rights).
63. See 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (holding that a state-mandated prescription
disclosure did not violate a constitutional privacy right); see also Doe v. Delie, 257
F.3d 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting the Whalen privacy interest test in determining
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected an HIV-positive inmate's privacy right in his
medical records).
64. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (discussing the claim that the statute infringes
upon Court-recognized "zones of privacy").
65. See id at 591-92 (detailing how the statute responded to commission findings
that existing laws were ineffective to prevent the illegal diversion of prescription
medications).
66. See id at 600 (recognizing that reporting has a deterrent effect spurred by valid
patient fears that disclosure adversely affects reputation).
67. See id. at 598.
68. See id. at 593-95 (highlighting that the files were stored in a room protected by
a locked wire fence and alarm system, the computer data was kept in a locked cabinet,
and the statute provided for the destruction of the files after five years).
69. See, e.g., Jessica Ansley Bodger, Note, Taking the Sting Out of Reporting
Requirements: Reproductive Health Clinics and the Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy, 56 DuKE L.J. 583, 595 (2006) (arguing that the "individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" recognized in Whalen is significant
in light of the need to protect the confidentiality of abortion services).
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personal decisions.70 Consequently, many lower courts interpret Whalen as
requiring a constitutional privacy analysis if state regulation infringes upon
the confidentiality of personal matters or independence in making personal
decisions.7'
The Whalen Court neither defined "personal matters" nor determined
which matters garner constitutional protection.72 The Court's subsequent
decision in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, however, affirmed
the right to privacy in personal matters and outlined a test for determining
whether a privacy interest falls within the scope of protected personal
matters. 73 The Nixon decision promulgates a two-part analysis whereby
courts determine: (1) whether the party asserting an interest in non-
disclosure of a personal matter has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
that matter, and (2) if so, whether the interest outweighs the government's
interest in disclosure.74
3. Personal Matters and the Disclosure of Personal Information: A Circuit
Split
Despite the Nixon guidelines, not all circuit courts conclude that the right
to privacy in personal matters protects against the disclosure of personal
information. 75 Nine circuits support this privacy protection, with six of
these circuits explicitly protecting medical records or HIV status.76 The
70. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 (upholding the statute because strict security
regulations and continued use of prescriptions shows that the law does not threaten
either privacy interest).
71. See, e.g., Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing Whalen as creating a constitutional right to privacy in non-disclosure of
personal matters).
72. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06 (highlighting that the holding turns on the
adequacy of the New York statutory scheme and noting that the Court is not deciding
any other issues in which unwarranted disclosures implicate privacy in personal
matters).
73. See 433 U.S. 425, 429-30, 456-58 (1977) (analyzing whether a statute requiring
an executive official to take custody of presidential papers and recordings
unconstitutionally violates the President's privacy interests and holding that the
personal matters of public officials are constitutionally protected).
74. See id. (weighing Nixon's legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal
communications against the government's interest in reviewing the communications).
75. Cf Bodger, supra note 69, at 599-600 (noting that the majority of circuit courts
hold that disclosure of private information garners some constitutional protection).
76. Compare Walls, 895 F.2d at 193, Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir.
1988), and Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding various
personal information as garnering protection under Whalen), with Norman-Bloodsaw v.
Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998); A L.A. v. West Valley
City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267
(2d Cir. 1994); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980), and Woods v. White,
689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988), affd, 899 F.2d 17, 17 (7th Cir. 1990)
(explicitly holding that medical records or HIV status constitute personal information
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Sixth Circuit denies the existence of a constitutional right to privacy in
personal information, and the Eighth Circuit only regards the right as
operative in circumstances of egregious disclosure.77 The D.C. Circuit
refrains from holding on the issue.78
Fourth Circuit right to privacy jurisprudence regarding medical records
and HIV status is inconclusive. 79 The Fourth Circuit is among the nine that
recognize the right to privacy in personal matters as encompassing a right
to non-disclosure of personal information.80 However, the Fourth Circuit
has declined to rule on whether medical records require constitutional
privacy protection. 8' The Fourth Circuit therefore presents no clear
precedent for determining whether South Carolina's reporting requirement
82
violates students' constitutional right to privacy.
Of the circuits recognizing a right to privacy in medical records, the
Third Circuit's United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. decision
articulates an especially comprehensive set of factors for consideration in
the Nixon balancing test.8 3 The factors are: (1) the type of record, (2) the
information the record contains, (3) the potential for harm from
unauthorized disclosure, (4) the injury that disclosure would cause to the
relationship in which the record was created, (5) the adequacy of the
measures taken to prevent disclosure, (6) the degree of the need for access,
and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, policy, or pertinent
protected by Whalen).
77. See Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (refusing to recognize
a right to non-disclosure of private information due to a lack of explicit mandate from
the Constitution or the Supreme Court); see also Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348,
1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding no unconstitutional violation of privacy because
disclosure was not extremely degrading, humiliating, or betraying).
78. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d
786, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing doubt that a right to privacy in personal
information exists).
79. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 483 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'don
other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (refraining from deciding whether medical records
garner constitutional right to privacy protection).
80. See Walls, 895 F.2d at 193-94 (holding that the constitutional right to privacy
in personal information was not violated because there was no reasonable expectation
of privacy in personal information that was publicly available).
81. See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 482-83 (holding that the appellants' right to privacy
in their medical records was not violated without deciding whether the appellants
possessed this right).
82. See id. (recognizing the circuit split regarding the privacy right in medical
records but not holding on the issue).
83. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 572 (3d Cir.
1980) (considering the constitutionality of disclosing employee medical records to the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health); see also Kamm, supra note 62,
at 564-65 (highlighting the seven factor Westinghouse test as especially helpful in
determining whether HIV reporting is justified because its multifaceted elements
provide for thorough analysis of medical disclosure issues).
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public interest tending toward supporting access to the information. 84
Other circuits commonly refer to Westinghouse in applying the Nixon
85balancing test to personal information cases.
D. Public School Students and the Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton held that
public school students enjoy a lesser expectation of personal privacy than
the general public.86 The various medical exams and procedures that states
require public school students to undergo corroborate this reduced
expectation.87 The states' keen interest in preserving the health and safety
of students justifies reasonable invasions of students' privacy.88
Even so, Vernonia does not completely strip public school students of
their constitutional privacy rights.89  The state must establish the
reasonableness of privacy invasions for courts to deem them
constitutional.9" The reasonableness turns on the extent to which the
expectation of privacy is decreased, the obtrusiveness of the invasion, and
the need for invasion.91
III. ANALYSIS
South Carolina's reporting requirement violates public school students'
constitutionally protected right to privacy in personal matters. 92  This
violation jeopardizes the state's public health goals of maintaining healthy
and safe students and stemming the spread of HIV/AIDS because it
undermines the use of universal precautions in South Carolina schools and
84. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578-79 (noting that the court must use several
factors in balancing the employee's privacy interests in their medical records against
the state interest in addressing occupational health hazards).
85. See, e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (using the
Westinghouse analysis to support its holding that the privacy right protects health
information).
86. See 515 U.S. 644, 657 (1995) (upholding drug testing for student athletes
because First, Fourth, and Fourteenth amendment rights operate differently in the
public school setting).
87. See id. at 656-57 (explaining that required vaccinations and physicals decrease
privacy expectations in schools).
88. See id. at 661 (recognizing the state's important interest in deterring drug use
and keeping drugs from infiltrating schools).
89. See id at 655-56 (holding that student status restricts constitutional rights but
does not eliminate them altogether).
90. Id. at 665.
91. See id. at 664-65 (sustaining drug testing of student athletes because the tests
are minimally invasive and the need to detect drug use by student athletes is great).
92. See, e.g., Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd, 899
F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that disclosure of inmate's HIV status by prison
medical personnel to nonmedical personnel violated the inmate's constitutional right to
privacy in his medical records).
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deters adolescents from receiving HIV tests.93 Since the state legislature
and governor illustrated an unwillingness to amend this unconstitutional
and detrimental law, courts must void the reporting requirement in the
interest of protecting students' constitutional right to privacy and
promoting effective public health policy.
94
A. The Reporting Requirement Infringes upon Public School Students'
Constitutionally Protected Right to Privacy in Personal Matters
1. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Non-Disclosure of
Medical Records and HIV Test Results
The privacy interest in one's HIV status satisfies the first part of the
Nixon right to privacy test because people reasonably and legitimately
expect privacy in their medical records, including their HIV status. 95 This
expectation is reasonable because medical records contain highly sensitive
information and require a heightened level of protection. 96 The federal
government recognizes the public expectation of privacy in medical
records, and it has responded by implementing national regulations
governing the maintenance and use of patient medical records.97 The
federal response legitimizes the public's reasonable expectation of privacy
in medical information, even though the federal regulations are not
explicitly framed as a means of protecting the constitutional right to
98privacy.
Positive HIV test results, even when compared to other kinds of medical
information, reasonably garner an especially heightened expectation of
93. See Sponsors, supra note 47 (explaining that the reporting requirement acts as a
barrier to students accessing HIV tests).
94. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (upholding a statutory reporting
requirement because the medical data was not disclosed beyond the state department of
health, which employed strict security measures to prevent disclosure, and the statute
did not significantly deter people from receiving medication).
95. See Judith Wagner DeCew, The Priority of Privacy for Medical Information, in
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 213, 213-17 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that
there is heightened public concern for the privacy of patient medical records due to the
sensitive information contained therein and discussing shortcomings in the statutory
guidelines for its protection).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.
1980) (noting that various federal regulations grant medical data a heightened level of
protection because information about one's body is especially intimate).
97. See Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the
Privacy Gap Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INF. L. 535, 536-37 (2001) (noting that the Health
Insurance Portability & Accountability Act ("HIPAA") regulations address popular
privacy concerns by regulating the use of people's medical information).
98. See id. at 538 (explaining that the Supreme Court recogrizes a fundamental
right to privacy but has not expounded an explicit constitutional nght to non-disclosure
of private information).
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privacy and confidentiality because of the extremely intimate nature of the
information.99 HIV/AIDS is a life-threatening illness often associated with
homosexuality, illegal drug use, or irresponsible sexual behavior, and those
living with HIV/AIDS are susceptible to stigmatization, discrimination, and
intolerance. 100 Due to this susceptibility, the unauthorized disclosure of
HIV/AIDS status potentially poses detrimental personal and social
consequences for infected individuals. 0 1 HIV/AIDS status garners a
legitimate expectation of privacy because of these consequences.10 2 The
Nixon decision therefore requires that courts afford protection to the non-
disclosure of HIV/AIDS status under the constitutional right to privacy in
personal matters. 1
03
Circuits that decline to recognize that the right to privacy in personal
matters includes the confidentiality of medical records and HIV status
refrain from applying the Nixon method for determining whether a privacy
interest falls within the scope of Whalen.'0 4 Instead, this minority of courts
disregard the right because the Supreme Court has not established the right
to privacy in personal information as a fundamental right, and no Supreme
Court decision explicitly recognizes medical information as encompassed
within the scope of the right to privacy.1
0 5
The minority's reasoning is unjustified in light of the non-textual nature
of the right to privacy. 0 6 Although the right to privacy is nebulous in its
99. See, e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding
that HIV/AIDS status is highly personal because of the negative social attitudes toward
HIV-positive persons).
100. See id. (protecting Doe's right to confidentiality in his H1V status under
Whalen because his status is especially personal and subject to social stigma).
101. See, e.g., Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd, 899
F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that HIV-positive persons have a high interest in
confidentiality because people associate H1V/AIDS with irresponsible sexual activity
and drug use).
102. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that the more intimate the information, the more justified the expectation that it will be
kept confidential).
103. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977) (holding that
disclosure of personal communications implicates Whalen privacy interests because
there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in these materials).
104. See Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (failing to consider
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy before finding that the disclosure
of medical records does not violate any constitutional rights and further stating that
only when "fundamental rights" are implicated does a right to privacy take on
"constitutional dimensions").
105. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1999),
rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that strict limitations on
disclosure apply only to "fundamental" rights and that the appellant's right to non-
disclosure of medical records had not been established as a fundamental right).
106. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that
individuals enjoy a protected privacy right even though the Constitution does not
explicitly state this right).
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origin and definition, its lack of parameters does not negate the existence of
a constitutionally protected right to privacy in personal information.'
0 7
Indeed, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the notion that a
constitutional right to privacy does not exist due to a lack of explicit textual
mandate, and lower courts are therefore unjustified in denying the right to
privacy in medical records simply because a Supreme Court decision has
yet to expressly define this right.
10 8
Additionally, the Nixon "legitimate expectation" standard and balancing
test constitute the precedent for determining whether a Whalen-protected
privacy interest exists and for analyzing government infringement upon this
interest. 109 The minority circuits have foregone this precedent, and as a
result, these courts deny judicial protection to legitimate and reasonable
privacy interests that the Constitution protects. 110
2. Public School Students' Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Their HIV
Test Results
The Whalen decision generally affords constitutional protection to the
HIV status of public school students because HIV status falls within the
scope of the right to privacy in personal matters."' Although the Supreme
Court's decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton holds that public
school children have a lesser privacy expectation in medical records than
the general public, students' privacy interest in their HIV status is
distinguishable from the student privacy interests considered in
Vernonia. 112
The situation of South Carolina's HIV-positive students differs from the
Vernonia case in three ways. First, HIV-positive students are different
from the student athletes in Vernonia because in receiving an HIV test, they
107. See id. at 484-85 (inferring that the Bill of Rights assumes a right to privacy,
including the right of married couples to use contraception).
108. See id. at 482-83 (illustrating that numerous rights not explicitly stated in the
Constitution-such as parents' right to educate a child in a school of their choice-
enjoy constitutional protection).
109. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977) (holding that
the Whalen precedent protects the appellant's privacy interest because he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal papers, but that the government's
interests outweighed appellant's, and thus finding no violation of appellant's
constitutional privacy right).
110. Compare Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing
Whalen and Nixon as precedent in holding that Doe had a constitutional right to non-
disclosure of his H1V status), with Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to acknowledge a constitutional right to medical privacy and finding that the
Whalen and Nixon holdings should not be imputed to Doe's claim).
111. See Doe, 15 F.3d at 267 (holding that Whalen's privacy interests encompass a
fight to confidentiality in health information, and that this right protects against
disclosure of one's H1V status).
112. See 515 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995).
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have not voluntarily engaged in a school activity that subjects them to
increased regulation. 13  Second, the Vernonia decision considers the
students' reduced privacy rights in regard to routine exams and procedures,
not in relation to the diagnosis and treatment of a potentially fatal and
socially stigmatizing disease. 1 4  Finally, the reporting requirement
constitutes a much greater intrusion on a student's privacy than the
urinalysis considered in Vernonia because it discloses the student's medical
condition (i.e., that the student is HIV-positive), instead of revealing that a
student ingested prohibited drugs." 5 Consequently, the reduced privacy
expectation in Vernonia does not apply to the legitimate expectation of
privacy that public school students have in their HIV/AIDS status." 6
3. South Carolina's Reporting Requirement: An Infringement Upon Public
School Students'Right to Privacy in Personal Matters
South Carolina's reporting requirement infringes upon both of the
privacy interests that the Whalen decision recognized and the right to
privacy in personal matters that the court protected.1 17 According to the
Supreme Court decisions in Whalen and Nixon, individuals have a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of
personal matters. 118  Personal matters encompass medical records and
health conditions such as one's HIV status.' 19 South Carolina's reporting
requirement mandates the disclosure of students' HIV status to public
113. See id. at 657 (holding that student athletes have a lesser privacy expectation
than the general student population because they choose to participate in school-
sponsored sports).
114. See id. at 656-57 (considering the lessened privacy interest in light of required
physical exams, vaccinations, scoliosis screenings, and vision, hearing, and dental
checks).
115. See id. at 658 (holding that there is a significant difference in the level of
intrusion on students' right to privacy between medical tests that reveal drug use and
those that reveal medical conditions such as pregnancy and diabetes).
116. Cf id. at 656-58, 664 (upholding the requirement that student athletes undergo
urinalyses because students have a lesser expectation of privacy in routine medical
exams and procedures and the urinalysis did not reveal any medical conditions of the
student) (emphasis added).
117. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 598, 599-600 (1977) (citing the individual's
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and the interest in independently
making certain important decisions as the two interests that constitute the right to
privacy in personal matters).
118. See id. at 599 (defining the interest in avoiding non-disclosure of personal
matters as one of two interests encompassed in the right to privacy); see also Nixon v.
Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (affirming the appellant's privacy
interest in non-disclosure of personal matters, including those related to family and
finances).
119. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 459 (protecting the non-disclosure of an individual's
private communications with certain others, such as those between President Nixon and
his physician).
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school officials, requires that the DHEC individually identify students in
this disclosure, and bars public school students from preventing the
disclosure of their status.1 20  Consequently, the reporting requirement
seriously infringes upon the Whalen-recognized privacy interest in non-
disclosure of personal matters. 12'
The disclosure mandated by the reporting requirement further infringes
upon the second privacy interest protected under the right to privacy in
personal matters: the interest in making independent personal decisions.
122
The maintenance of confidentiality in health care often determines whether
adolescents seek medical advice and assistance. 123  Adolescents are
especially unlikely to access health services, such as HIV testing, if they
doubt that their health information will be kept confidential. 124  The
reporting requirement will likely deter students from accessing HIV tests
because it compromises the confidentiality of students' positive test
results. 125  The requirement, therefore, fundamentally influences the
students' choice in whether to undergo an HIV test. 126 In so doing, the
reporting requirement infringes upon adolescents' privacy right in
independently making personal health decisions in addition to their privacy
right in non-disclosure of personal matters. 27  The Nixon privacy test
therefore maintains that the reporting requirement can only pass
constitutional muster if the state's interest in disclosure of students'
HIV/AIDS status outweighs the students' interest in non-disclosure. 28
120. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135(e) (2008) (stating that certain public school
officials must be notified if a student in their district tests positive for HIV); see also
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-21(H)(3)(a) (2008) (requiring that HIV-positive students'
names, dates of birth, and addresses be provided in the report).
121. See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
non-consensual disclosure of the appellant's HIV status infringed upon his right to
privacy under Whalen).
122. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 (establishing the interest in independence in
making important personal decisions as one of two privacy interests encompassed in
the right to privacy).
123. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 289-90 (arguing that confidentiality is a chief
concern in adolescent care because privacy doubts deter youths from accessing health
services).
124. See id. (emphasizing that physicians cannot encourage HIV testing of
adolescents when confidentiality fears prevent adolescents from being candid with their
doctors or from accessing treatment altogether).
125. See § 44-29-135(e) (undermining physician-patient confidentiality in
adolescent health care by requiring that HIV status be reported to school officials).
126. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 286 (describing how reporting requirements
such as mandatory parental notification potentially discourage adolescents from
accessing HIV testing and treatment).
127. Cf Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603 (noting that the prescription reporting requirement
in the case at bar did impinge upon the decision of some patients to access medication
but did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because thousands of people
were still filling their prescriptions).
128. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (upholding the
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B. In Applying the Nixon Balancing Test, Courts Should Grant Significant
Weight to Students 'Interest in Non-Disclosure of Their HIV Status, and
They Should Use the Westinghouse Factors to Weigh This Interest Against
the State's Interest in Disclosure
1. The Significant Weight of the Privacy Interest in Non-Disclosure of HIV
Status
The constitutional right to privacy in personal matters differs from other
Court-recognized privacy rights in two ways: first, the Court has not
explicitly held that privacy in personal matters is a fundamental right, and
second, the Court applies a balancing test instead of a strict scrutiny
standard. 2 9 Some courts interpret these differences as mandating lesser
constitutional protection for privacy interests in "personal matters.'
' 30
However, this interpretation is overbroad because the distinctive analysis
for privacy in personal matters determines the strength of protection vis-A-
vis the specific privacy interest asserted. 131 While some privacy interests
may warrant a minimal level of constitutional protection, other interests,
such as the interest in maintaining the confidentiality of one's HIV status,
necessitate heightened constitutional protection.
1 32
The privacy interest in non-disclosure of one's HIV status requires
heightened constitutional protection and should be afforded significant
weight in the personal matters analysis because it implicates many of the
same concerns that caused the Supreme Court to deem other privacy
interests fundamental rights. 33  For example, disclosure of one's HIV
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act because the public interest
in disclosing the presidential communications outweighed the individual privacy
interest in the personal materials contained therein).
129. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding a
fundamental right to privacy in marriage and voiding a law forbidding the use of
contraception because the law was not narrowly drawn), with Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465
(balancing a legitimate expectation of privacy in personal communications against the
state's interest in disclosing the communications).
130. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
disclosure of an inmate's medical records was not an unconstitutional violation of a
fundamental right).
131. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465 (holding the expectation of privacy in the
communications to be weak because of the appellant's status as a public figure and
because the communications contained few private materials).
132. See Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988), afftd, 899 F.2d
17 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing Westinghouse and noting that medical information,
especially HIV status, requires increased protection and differential treatment due to its
personal nature).
133. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing that the
fundamental right to privacy encompasses abortion in part because of the psychological
harm and stigma imposed by an unwanted pregnancy), with Hilton, supra note 1, at 13-
14 (describing the emotional toll of HIV-related stigmatization).
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status bears consequences similar to the consequences of denying a woman
her fundamental privacy right to terminate her pregnancy. 34  In
determining that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, the Court in Roe v. Wade gave considerable weight to the harmful
personal effects of an unwanted pregnancy, such as present and future
personal distress, psychological harm, and the continuing stigmatization
suffered by unwed mothers.
135
The stories of Crystal Hilton and other HIV-positive adolescents
illustrate how the same harms may arise in relation to the disclosure of HIV
status. 136 Just as women facing unwanted pregnancy suffer the effects
described by the Roe Court, HIV-positive students whose status is
disclosed suffer extreme social stigmatization that results in fear,
depression, and decreased self-esteem. 137 Disclosure may even result in
discrimination that jeopardizes students' future education. 138  Students'
privacy interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their HIV status
should therefore command significant weight when balanced against the
state interest in disclosure under the Nixon test.1
39
2. The Westinghouse Factors: A Comprehensive Framework for Balancing
Student and State Interests
The Westinghouse factors provide the best framework for weighing the
privacy interests of HIV-positive students against the public health interests
of the state. 140  A balance of these interests should consider the
Westinghouse factors because neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth
134. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (noting the ongoing social stigma that surrounds
single motherhood).
135. See id. at 153-54 (describing the detrimental effects of denying a woman an
abortion and concluding that these effects require recognition that the privacy right
includes abortion).
136. See, e.g., Hilton, supra note 1, at 12-14 (describing how public disclosure of
Crystal's HIV status exposed her to extensive stigmatization and discrimination, such
as harassing, late night phone calls from classmates asking her "Do you really have
AIDS?").
137. See, e.g., id. at 14 (explaining how harassment by other students caused Crystal
to hate herself and to fear going to school).
138. See, e.g., id. at 13 (detailing Crystal and her grandmother's suspicion that fear
of her HIV status led school officials to expel Crystal from school).
139. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458-59 (1977) (granting the
asserted privacy interest less weight because it was weaker than interests asserted in
prior cases).
140. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (articulating seven factors in finding that disclosure of employee medical records
did not violate the right to privacy); see also Kevin M. Kramer, Comment, A National
Epidemic, A National Conversation, A National Law: In Support of Unique Identifier
Reporting for HIV Surveillance, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 173, 196 (1999)(emphasizing the factors' applicability in potential litigation arising from HIV
surveillance methods).
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Circuit have defined a comprehensive framework for analyzing interests
that implicate the right to privacy in personal matters.'14 Furthermore, the
Westinghouse factors essentially encompass the scattered considerations
articulated in various Fourth Circuit privacy decisions. 142  The factors
additionally constitute the most inclusive list of balancing factors relevant
to informational privacy, and they prove particularly useful in analyzing
whether HIV reporting requirements unconstitutionally infringe upon the
right to privacy in personal matters.
143
C. South Carolina's Reporting Requirement Unconstitutionally Violates
Students' Right to Privacy in Non-Disclosure of Their HIV Status Because
the Privacy Interest of Students Outweighs the Public Health Interest of the
State
Performing the second part of the Nixon right to privacy analysis on
South Carolina's reporting requirement requires the balancing of two
competing, legally-recognized interests: the student's interest in the
confidentiality of her HIV status, as encompassed by the right to privacy in
personal matters, weighed against the state's interest in protecting the
health and safety of public school students by preventing the spread of
communicable diseases. 144 An application of the Westinghouse balancing
test factors to these interests reveals that public school students' privacy
interests significantly outweigh South Carolina's public health interest.
1 45
141. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (limiting its holding to
reporting schemes that use similar security measures to those used by New York); see
also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd on
other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (considering only the number of disclosures in
holding that if there is a right to non-disclosure of medical records, the right was not
violated).
142. Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578 (describing seven
deciding factors for consideration in the privacy balancing test), with Greenville
Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 369
(4th Cir. 2002) (establishing the nature of information and necessity of disclosure as
factors in the right to privacy analysis), Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d
482, 487 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the AIDS stigma lends more weight to an
individual's privacy interest), Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194 (4th Cir.
1990) (considering the possibility of unauthorized disclosure and the adequacy of
safeguards), and Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
prison psychologist's promise of confidentiality weakens the plaintiffs claim that
answering questions about his family history violates his right to privacy).
143. See, e.g., Kamm, supra note 62, at 564-65 (emphasizing the applicability of the
Westinghouse analysis to potential HIV privacy cases because of its
comprehensiveness).
144. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1904) (affirming the state
interest in promoting public health by preventing the spread of smallpox); see also
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (recognizing the individual privacy interests in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters).
145. See Walls, 895 F.2d at 192 (explaining that even where the government has
compelling interests for restricting a privacy right, the individual prevails if his interest
outweighs the government's interest).
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Consequently, courts must hold that South Carolina's reporting
requirement unconstitutionally infringes upon public school students'
constitutional right to privacy in their personal matters.'
46
1. Factors One and Two: The Type of Record Requested and the
Information the Record Does or Might Contain
The reporting requirement compels the DHEC to disclose an individually
identifiable medical record that reveals a student's HIV status to public
school authorities.147 In general, medical records such as this garner more
weight than other kinds of personal information because one has a strong
expectation of privacy in information related to one's health.14 This
expectation stems from the legal confidentiality normally granted to
medical information and the personal nature of the information that a
medical record contains.' 49 Consequently, courts often treat disclosure of
medical information as more serious than disclosure of other types of
personal information. 150  The inclusion of information that allows the
subject of the medical information to be personally and individually
identified compounds the seriousness of disclosing this type of record, and
in addition, the Supreme Court has preferred laws protecting anonymity
when analyzing whether reporting requirements unconstitutionally infringe
upon the constitutional right to privacy. 151
Classifying a student's HIV status as an individually identifiable medical
record establishes the student's legitimate expectation of privacy in the
information; however, it does not render the information impermeable to
146. See id. (upholding a questionnaire because the city's interest in performing
background checks outweighed the employee's interest in non-disclosure of personal
and financial data).
147. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135(e) (2008) (requiring the DHEC to notify
school officials if a minor student tests positive for HIV/AIDS); see also S.C. CODE
ANN. REGS. 61-2 1(H)(3)(a) (2008) (stating that the DHEC must provide the officials
with the name, birth date, address, and medical status of the HIV-positive minor).
148. See, e.g., Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling
that circulating nude photos of an inmate's wife did not violate his constitutional right
to privacy in personal matters and highlighting that the disclosure involved neither
highly personal medical nor financial information).
149. See Davis, supra note 97, at 545 (explaining how the federal government
responded to social concerns about the confidentiality of medical information by
passing and implementing HIPAA).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cir. 1980) (citing the increased burden for discovery of medical information imposed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the exemption of medical records from the
Freedom of Information Act to corroborate the court's assertion that personal medical
information garners greater protection than other information).
151. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900-01 (1992)
(upholding a statute that required abortion agencies to report anonymous patient
information, such as patients' ages, because the statute did not unreasonably violate
patient privacy).
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constitutional disclosure because states retain the power to infringe
reasonably upon privacy rights. 152 The weight given to a medical record
ultimately turns on the second factor of the Westinghouse test: the
information the record does or might contain. 1
53
The second Westinghouse factor favors the students' privacy interest
because data confirming one's HIV-positive status is of a more sensitive
and personal nature than the medical information considered in the
Westinghouse decision. 154 In Westinghouse, there was no evidence that the
medical information at issue contained anything more than routine medical
test results. 55 The appellee failed to show that the information at issue was
of a highly sensitive or personal nature.1 56  Comparably, the HIV test
results disclosed in compliance with South Carolina's reporting
requirement divulge that a potentially fatal and unquestionably stigmatizing
disease infects a student attending the school. 157  The highly sensitive
nature of this information is court-recognized and commonly understood.
158
Since the information at issue is not only a medical record, but an
individually identifiable medical record of a highly personal nature, the
first and second factors of the Westinghouse test require that courts accord
significant weight to students' privacy interest in the non-disclosure of their
HIV status.
159
152. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 606-07 (1977) (recognizing that
appellants have a privacy interest in individually identifiable prescription information
but upholding a statute that mandated the reporting of this information).
153. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th
Cir. 1998) (determining that results from unauthorized medical tests for syphilis and
pregnancy bear greater weight in a privacy balancing test due to the nature of the data).
154. Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 580 (holding that the
government interest in disclosure of employee medical records outweighed the
employee's interest where the information in the records was not highly personal), with
Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 331 (3d Cir. 2001) (Nygaard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (describing the circuit's use of Westinghouse to affirm the right to privacy
in medical records and acknowledging that the medical privacy of individuals with HIV
garners heightened protection).
155. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 579 (explaining that the employees'
medical records contained results from routine X-rays, blood tests, audio, and visual
tests that were not particularly sensitive).
156. See id.
157. See generally LISANNE BROWN ET AL., INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE HIV/AIDS
STIGMA: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 4-5 (2001) (describing the widespread fear,
stigmatization, and hostility associated with HIV/AIDS).
158. See, e.g., Delie, 257 F.3d at 331 (Nygaard, J., concurring and dissenting)
(noting the special importance in protecting the medical privacy of HIV-positive
persons because they often face discrimination and violence).
159. Cf Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.3d at 579 (giving little weight to the
information contained in employee medical records because the information was not of
a sensitive nature).
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2. Factor Three: The Potential for Harm in Any Subsequent
Nonconsensual Disclosures
The inadvertent or purposeful disclosure of a student's HIV-positive
status to other individuals likely carries extremely harmful consequences
for the HIV-positive student.1 60  People who are HIV-positive often
encounter stigmatization or discrimination due to their status.1 61  The
stigma arises from the common association of HIV/AIDS with
homosexuality, prostitution, intravenous drug use, and reckless sexual
behavior, and this association often intensifies the stigmatization suffered
by individuals living with HIV/AIDS. 1
62
An HIV-positive child whose status is made public will often be
marginalized, bullied, and ridiculed due to the stigma attached to HIV, and
this treatment could escalate to more dangerous forms of violence and
abuse.163  Additionally, he or she may be discouraged, if not outright
prohibited, from participating in certain activities, especially if other
individuals fear infection through casual contact.' 64  Peers may further
stigmatize and fear the HIV-positive child if the child is injured, and others
may treat the injury with a heightened sense of caution or alarm. 165 Such
treatment could adversely affect the child's self-esteem, social skills, and
ability to learn.166 Considering the high potential for harm if disclosure of a
student's HIV status occurs, this Westinghouse factor clearly weighs in
favor of upholding the privacy interests of students against the state interest
160. See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that it is especially important for HIV-positive individuals to control the disclosure of
their status due to the negative social attitudes directed towards them).
161. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 157, at 1-2 (noting the ubiquitous nature and
international prevalence of the AIDS stigma).
162. See id. at 4 (describing how HIV/AIDS stigma is compounded by other stigmas
associated with groups of people whose behavior is viewed as rendering them at risk
for HIV infection).
163. See, e.g., Delie, 257 F.3d at 331 (Nygaard, J., concurring and dissenting)
(discussing how the discrimination and violence experienced by individuals with HIV
led the Third Circuit to recognize a heightened interest in HIV patients' medical
privacy).
164. See JONES, supra note 4, at 19 (recounting how one child refused to hold the
hand of a classmate who was HIV-positive during a game of Duck-Duck-Goose).
165. See id. at 8 (describing how school personnel inadvertently singled out an HIV-
positive student by using latex gloves to treat her injuries but not those of other
children); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(1), (3) (2008) (highlighting the need for
using safety measures, such as wearing latex gloves, in every situation where there is a
risk of exposure to blood or bodily fluids because proper safety standards require that
all such fluids be considered potentially infectious).
166. See Hilton, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining how her experience with HIV/AIDS
stigma at school caused her to fear school, become depressed, and suffer long-term
shame).
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in disclosing their HIV status to public school officials. 167
3. Factor Four: The Injury from Disclosure to the Relationship in which
the Record Was Generated
A doctor-patient relationship generates the medical record that is
mandatorily disclosed under the reporting requirement. 68 This relationship
may be significantly inhibited if minors learn that the doctor must report
positive HIV test results to the DHEC, which will then report this
information to officials at their schools. 169  The minor adolescent may
refrain from entering a doctor-patient relationship in the first place because
the confidentiality of the resulting medical information (i.e., the
adolescent's HIV test results) cannot be guaranteed. 70 Alternatively, an
adolescent who does enter a doctor-patient relationship seeking sexual
health care may refuse to heed a doctor's recommendation for HIV testing
if the adolescent knows that the results cannot be kept confidential by the
doctor.17' The doctor and patient would therefore lose the important
opportunity for detection and treatment of HIV.'72
The reporting requirement may also prove injurious to adolescents
already engaging in doctor-patient relationships. 73 Adolescents are likely
to avoid doctor recommendations for HIV testing altogether by lying to
their doctors about their risk for HIV infection. 174 This lack of candor
jeopardizes the doctor's ability to provide well-informed health care for
167. Cf United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3d Cir.
1980) (giving less weight to the privacy interests of employees because there was no
evidence that they would suffer adverse consequences from the required disclosure of
their medical records to government personnel).
168. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-21(C)(1), (H)(3)(a) (2008) (requiring physicians
and other health professionals to report the identities of patients who test positive for
STDs to the DHEC and obliging the DHEC to report the identities of minor public
school students with HIV/AIDS to school officials).
169. See AIDS ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 28, at 16 (recommending strict
privacy and informed consent policies when engaging HIV-positive youths because
effective programs require participants' trust).
170. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 289 (explaining how doubts about
confidentiality deter youths from seeking sexual health care).
171. See Yvonne Wenger, House to Debate AIDS, HIV Bill, CHARLESTON POST &
COURIER, Apr. 13, 2008, at BI (reporting that the deterrent effect of the reporting
requirement galvanized legislative efforts to eliminate the law).
172. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 289 (explaining that adolescent hesitance to
access HIV tests is especially dangerous because early detection and treatment are
essential in prolonging the survival of HIV-positive individuals and curbing the spread
of infection).
173. See id. (describing how privacy and confidentiality form the foundation of an
effective doctor-patient relationship).
174. See id. at 289-90 (detailing the tendency of adolescents to censor the
information they provide to their doctors if they doubt that the communication will be
kept confidential).
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young patients and prevents adolescents from receiving treatment for
dangerous diseases.1 75  Due to the high probability of impairment to
potential and existing relationships between doctors and adolescent
patients, the fourth factor of the Westinghouse analysis also weighs in favor
of the students' interest in non-disclosure of their HIV test results. 1
76
4. Factor Five: The Adequacy of Safeguards to Prevent Unauthorized
Disclosure
The safeguards instituted by the South Carolina reporting requirement
and its implementing regulations do not adequately prevent unauthorized
disclosure of students' HIV status. 177 The state law provides some security
insofar as it requires school personnel to keep students' HIV status strictly
confidential, and a person who violates this confidentiality is subject to
criminal and civil penalties. 178  However, these safeguards do not
sufficiently protect against disclosure because they fail to mandate a secure
procedure for maintaining students' status information in a confidential
manner. 179 Criminal and civil penalties provide a strong disincentive for
purposeful disclosure by an individual; however, they fail to guard against
the inadvertent disclosure and illicit access that may result if the records
containing students' medical information are improperly secured. 
80
The reporting requirement and its implementing regulations fall
significantly short of the safety standards established in Whalen v. Roe
because of their complete failure to delineate security standards for the
maintenance of student records. 181 Unlike the New York statute upheld in
Whalen, South Carolina's laws do not compel school officials to provide
175. See AIDS ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 28, at 16 (explaining that
youths are more likely to disclose risky behavior, such as sexual conduct and substance
abuse, when confidentiality is assured).
176. Cf United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3d Cir.
1980) (upholding the disclosure of employee medical records in part because the
disclosure did not significantly undermine the employer-employee relationship).
177. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (highlighting the state's duty
to physically secure the records it collects).
178. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-21(G)(3) (2008); see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§
44-1-150, 44-29-140 (2008) (establishing that breaches of confidentiality by public
school personnel may constitute a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $200,
imprisonment up to thirty days, or a civil penalty).
179. See 61-21 (G) (requiring that DHEC and public school personnel keep students'
HIV status strictly confidential without creating guidelines for securing records that
contain this information).
180. See 61-21(H)(2) (penalizing personnel breaches of confidentiality without
addressing the inadvertent breaches that may result from unsecured student medical
records).
181. See 429 U.S. at 605 (upholding the reporting requirement because its
implementing procedures mandate specific security measures made to prevent
unauthorized record access).
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heightened security for the highly sensitive, personally identifiable
information disclosed in accordance with the reporting requirement, nor do
the laws specify procedures for restricting unauthorized access to this
information. 182 This lack of security protocol renders the students' HIV
status information susceptible to unlawful disclosure or access, and as a
result, this factor of the Westinghouse test weighs against the state interest
in the disclosure of minor students' HIV status to public school officials. 1
83
5. Factor Six: The Degree of Need for Access
The use of universal precautions eliminates the need to grant public
school officials access to students' HIV status information.' 84 The CDC
and the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")
promote universal precautions as the most effective means of preventing
the spread of blood-borne pathogens in institutional settings. 18  Universal
precautions prevent the spread of blood-borne pathogens without requiring
prior knowledge of infection because the measures simply presume that all
blood or bodily fluids present a risk of transferring contagious
pathogens. 86 This presumption mandates the use of protective measures
every time a situation poses a risk of exposure to bodily fluids. 87 Since
persons using universal precautions treat all exposure risks with the utmost
care, they do not differentiate between treatment of persons who are HIV-
positive, persons who are HIV-negative, and persons whose HIV status is
unknown. 188  Knowledge of a person's HIV status is therefore
inconsequential in implementing the CDC and OSHA recommended public
safety measures.' 
89
182. See id. at 593-94 (describing the numerous security measures implemented to
secure the information at issue in Whalen, including an alarm system and locked wire
fence protecting the room containing the records, locks on the filing cabinets, and
statutorily mandated record destruction after five years).
183. Cf id. at 606 (weighing the statutory safeguards in favor of the state because
they provided the medical records with highly sufficient protection against
unauthorized disclosure).
184. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b) (2008) (defining "universal precautions" as
an infection control approach based on the concept that one treats all blood and certain
bodily fluids as if one knows that a pathogen infects the fluids).
185. See id. §§ 1910.1030(c)(1)(i), (d)(1) (requiring all employers whose employees
risk occupational exposure to mandate the use of universal precautions).
186. See id. § 1910.1030(b) (asserting this presumption since the infection status of
bodily fluids is often unknown).
187. See id. § 1910.1030(d)(3)(i), (ii), (ix) (requiring the provision and use of
personal protective equipment such as latex gloves and the use of disinfectants
whenever one can reasonably anticipate exposure).
188. See id. § 1910.1030(d)(1) (mandating the use of universal precautions
whenever there is a risk of exposure to blood or other potentially infectious materials).
189. See id. (compelling employers to implement an Exposure Control Plan that
entails the use of universal precautions in all situations that present an exposure risk).
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Universal precautions do not address situations where exposure to blood
or bodily fluids is not preventable, and South Carolina may argue that
public school officials need to know that a student is HIV-positive in case
of accidental exposure to the student's blood or bodily fluids. 9° The
reporting requirement is still unnecessary, however, because South
Carolina law provides for post-exposure notification by the DHEC. 9' If a
dangerous exposure were to occur, the DHEC may release a student's
positive HIV test result to a school nurse or physician in order to protect
the health of the person exposed to the risk.192 Furthermore, doctors may
prescribe post-exposure prophylaxis in cases of dangerous exposure,
independent of whether the doctor knows the infection status of the blood
or bodily fluid. 193 These post-exposure options, paired with the use of
universal precautions, negate the need for notifying school officials when a
student tests positive for HIV/AIDS.1
94
The lack of necessity for the reporting requirement, although weighing in
favor of invalidating the law, does not automatically render the law
unconstitutional. 195  Unnecessary legislation does not equate to
unconstitutional legislation, and the Whalen decision expressly forbids
courts to declare legislation unconstitutional solely because it lacks
absolute necessity. 196 The decision instead obliges courts to consider the
rationality of the legislation in light of the law's purpose, and the
Westinghouse balancing test reiterates the need for this reasonableness
190. See, e.g., id. § 1910.1030(d)(3)(ii), (ix) (mandating that the employee use
"professional judgment" to determine when exposure to blood or bodily fluids is not
preventable and to use gloves when one can "reasonably anticipate" contact with bodily
fluids).
191. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135(d) (2008) (permitting the DHEC to disclose
confidential STD records to medical personnel if the disclosure is necessary to protect
any person's health or life).
192. See id (providing exceptions to the requirement that the DHEC keep STD
records strictly confidential).
193. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EXPOSURE TO BLOOD:
WHAT HEALTHCARE PERSONNEL NEED TO KNow 4-6 (2003), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/bbp/exp to blood.pdf (explaining the protocol
for treating high-risk occupational exposures-when the source or status of the bodily
fluid is unknown).
194. See Wenger, supra note 171 (detailing the process used when a student comes
into contact with another's blood, and noting that introduced legislation removing the
reporting requirement would have no impact on the safety procedures already used in
schools).
195. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1977) (dismissing the district
court's finding that New York's reporting requirement was unnecessary and therefore
unconstitutional and instead considering whether the law was reasonable because states
need legislative flexibility to address local problems).
196. See id. (highlighting how the Court has overruled the necessity doctrine
promulgated in earlier cases).
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inquiry. 197  The Court-mandated reasonableness analysis requires a
consideration of the seventh Westinghouse factor: the express public policy
compelling South Carolina to retain the reporting requirement.
198
6. Factor Seven: The Express Statutory Mandate, Public Policy, or
Recognizable Public Interest Militating Toward Access
The governor's rationale for retaining the reporting requirement asserts
that knowledge of a student's HIV/AIDS status increases the health and
safety of students and personnel in public schools. 99 Courts recognize the
promotion of public health and safety as a legitimate state interest, yet the
Whalen and Westinghouse decisions require the reporting requirement to be
a reasonable means for realizing these interests. 20 0 The governor does not
explain his logic for retaining the reporting requirement in the interest of
health and safety, but his rationale implicitly suggests that a school will
institute heightened safety measures to manage risks of exposure to the
blood or bodily fluids of a child who has HIV or AIDS.20 1 These elevated
safety measures presumably improve the overall health and safety of school
students and staff, and therefore further the state interest in promoting
public health and safety.20 2
The reasonableness of this justification for the reporting requirement
fails, however, because school officials cannot actually use a student's HIV
status information to improve health and safety standards in the school.20 3
197. See id. at 597-98 (finding that the state reasonably anticipated the prescription
reporting requirement to minimize illicit use of legal drugs because the law resulted
from an extensive legislative process and considered the effectiveness of similar
programs in other states); see also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 575 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the appellee's request for the appellant's
employee medical records was reasonably relevant to the appellee's statutory authority
to evaluate occupational health hazards).
198. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597-98 (determining the reasonableness of the
prescription drug reporting requirement on the basis of its anticipated relevance to the
state's goal of reducing the illegal use of prescription medications).
199. See 88 S.C. S. JOUR., 2008 Reg. Sess. (June 25, 2008) (vetoing the bill
repealing the reporting requirement because eliminating notification undermines the
health and safety of all students).
200. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 572, 575 (recognizing the
important state interest in health and safety but requiring that the mandated disclosure
be reasonably relevant to the agency's authority to realize that interest).
201. See 88 S.C. S. JouR., 2008 Reg. Sess. (acknowledging that federal law prohibits
subsequent disclosure of students' HIV status, but maintaining that eliminating the
reporting requirement undermines officials' ability to preserve the health and safety of
students).
202. See id (asserting that the notification requirement should be expanded to
include other contagious, blood-borne diseases in order to further protect the health and
safety of students).
203. See Wenger, supra note 171 (explaining that the prohibition against subsequent
disclosure of a student's HIV status renders the information useless in influencing
safety procedures).
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In addition to the strict confidentiality required under South Carolina law,
the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA")
prohibits the release of a student's personally identifiable information to
other school officials, including teachers, unless the officials have a
legitimate educational interest in the information.2 °4 FERPA does not
allow school officials to disclose the HIV status of a student for the
promotion of general health and safety.205 Furthermore, the ADA, as
interpreted in Bragdon, protects HIV-positive students against differential
treatment unless the school shows that the student poses a "direct threat" to
others.20 6 Since casual contact does not spread HIV/AIDS, HIV-positive
students simply do not pose a direct threat to health and safety in a school
207
setting. °  Consequently, South Carolina's reporting requirement proves
unreasonable because state and federal privacy law renders individually
identifiable information regarding a student's HIV/AIDS status essentially
useless in promoting health and safety in schools.20 8
The governor's rationale also proves dangerously faulty because it
209undermines the essential presumption of universal precautions.
Universal precautions presume danger and mandate utmost care in all
situations involving an exposure risk, while the governor's implicit
suggestion of heightened safety for HIV-positive students presumes danger
and mandates utmost care only when one knows that a person is infected
with HIV/AIDS. 210 Employing heightened safety measures only in cases of
known HIV/AIDS infection assumes that a student's blood or bodily fluids
do not pose a risk if the DHEC has not reported the student as HIV-
positive.2 1  This mistaken assumption fails to consider two points: first,
204. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A) (2006) (refusing to fund schools that release
students' personally identifiable information to personnel without parents' written
consent unless there is a legitimate educational interest in disclosure).
205. See id. (restricting the exception solely to legitimate educational interests). But
see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I) (allowing for the release of information in
individualized health or safety emergencies, subject to further regulation).
206. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998) (holding that a woman's HIV
infection constitutes a disability, but remanding to determine whether it posed a direct
threat to her dentist).
207. See JONES, supra note 4, at 37 (recommending HIV/AIDS education to children
that stresses the importance of not touching other students' blood while. also explaining
that "you can't get AIDS by being a friend").
208. See id. at 36-37 (explaining that FERPA generally binds school officials to
respect the privacy of HIV-positive students and to uphold the confidentiality of the
students' health records).
209. See 88 S.C. S. JoUR., 2008 Reg. Sess. (June 25, 2008) (suggesting that
notification of students' HIV status allows schools to better ensure the health and safety
of students).
210. See id. (maintaining that the reporting requirement increases safety and health
at schools despite federal prohibitions on subsequent disclosure of students' HIV/AIDS
status).
211. See Wenger, supra note 171 (highlighting the necessity of universal
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many students have not received HIV tests, so some students are infected
but unreported, and second, bodily fluids may contain other dangerous,
contagious pathogens besides HIV.212 The reporting requirement therefore
creates a false sense of security regarding the safety of students' blood and
bodily fluids, and actually jeopardizes students and school personnel rather
than promoting the health and safety of public schools,.213
The reporting requirement further jeopardizes the health and safety of
students by deterring adolescents from receiving HIV tests.214 Routine
HIV testing constitutes a critical element of combating the HIV/AIDS
crisis currently gripping the United States.21 5 Adolescents informed of the
disclosure of positive HIV test results to their schools refrain from
accessing HIV tests because they legitimately fear confidentiality breaches,
stigma, and discrimination.216 Consequently, many adolescents remain
ignorant of their HIV status.217 This ignorance jeopardizes their own health
and renders them likely to unwittingly spread HIV to their sexual
partners. 21" Therefore, the reporting requirement ultimately undermines the
health and safety of school students.219 In doing so, it fails to meet the
Whalen and Westinghouse reasonableness standards.22°
IV. CONCLUSION
South Carolina's reporting requirement violates HIV-positive students'
right to non-disclosure of their HIV status, as encompassed by the
precautions because schools do not know of every student who has HIV/AIDS, despite
the reporting requirement).
212. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b) (2008) (mandating a presumption of risk in all
situations because the infection status of bodily fluids is often unknown and noting that
blood-borne pathogens include HIV, Hepatitis B, and other diseases).
213. See id. § 1910.1030(d)(1) (requiring the use of universal precautions as the
primary means of preventing contact with potentially infectious materials).
214. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 26, at 289 (explaining that adolescents are less
likely to access health care, especially HIV testing, if they doubt confidentiality).
215. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 4 (recommending routine HIV testing
for adolescents and adults).
216. See AIDS ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 28, at 16 (explaining that
awareness of HIV stigma and discrimination renders youths wary of using services that
do not guarantee confidentiality).
217. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 285 (noting that adolescent HIV infection rates
are underestimated because so many adolescents fail to access HIV tests).
218. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 4 (reporting that HIV-positive
individuals aware of their status are sixty-eight percent less likely to engage in
unprotected sex than HIV-positive persons unaware of their status).
219. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 289-90 (describing how deterrence from testing
results in delayed detection and treatment, as well as the increased spread of H1V).
220. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1977) (requiring the statute to
reasonably advance the state interest in curbing illicit drug use before holding that it is
constitutional).
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constitutional right to privacy in personal matters.22' The requirement
violates students' privacy right because the students' strong interest in non-
disclosure of their HIV statuses clearly outweighs South Carolina's interest
in disclosure to public school officials. 222 An application of the Nixon
balancing test employing the comprehensive Westinghouse factors reveals
that all seven factors weigh in favor of granting constitutional protection to
the students' interest: (1) the records at issue are personally identifiable and
medical in nature, (2) the information in the records reveals HIV/AIDS
status, which is especially personal and requires heightened protection, (3)
nonconsensual disclosure and subsequent stigmatization create extreme
personal hardship on students living with HIV/AIDS, (4) disclosure
seriously undermines the adolescent-doctor relationship, (5) South Carolina
regulations fail to properly safeguard student medical records, (6) universal
precautions and post-exposure reporting eliminate school officials' need for
access, and (7) the reporting requirement does not reasonably further the
state's public health and safety goals. 3  A close examination of the
reporting requirement's implications indicates that it actually jeopardizes
the health and safety of students and school personnel instead of promoting
this important interest.
224
South Carolina has thus far failed to protect the rights and health of
public school students by eliminating the reporting requirement.225  The
reporting requirement renders HIV-positive students, like Crystal Hilton,
susceptible to nonconsensual disclosure of their status and widespread
226
stigmatization. Furthermore, the requirement deters adolescents from
accessing HIV tests and undermines the use of universal precautions in
schools.227 Lawmakers therefore must renew their efforts to abolish the
221. See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the
plaintiff has a constitutional right to privacy in the confidentiality of his HIV status
under Whalen).
222. See id. (recognizing that HIV/AIDS status especially requires constitutional
privacy protection because of the fatal nature and social stigma associated with the
disease).
223. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (explaining that courts only allow state infringement on medical record privacy
when an evaluation of these factors shows that the state interest in disclosure outweighs
the privacy interest in non-disclosure).
224. See, e.g., Wenger, supra note 171 (stating that lawmakers sought to eliminate
the requirement because of reports that it caused teens to refuse HIV tests).
225. See STATENET, supra note 48, at 1-2 (reporting that the legislature failed to
override the governor's veto).
226. See, e.g., JoNEs, supra note 4, at 36 (explaining that non-consensual disclosure
by school officials may cause rumors about an HIV-positive child to spread throughout
her community).
227. See, e.g., AIDS ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 28, at 16 (highlighting
how youths will not access HIV programs and services unless providers ensure
confidentiality).
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reporting requirement and replace it with the mandated use of universal
precautions in public schools.228 If South Carolina again proves unwilling
to enact these important legislative changes, courts must invalidate the
reporting requirement in the interest of protecting public school students'
constitutional right to privacy in personal matters and promoting effective
public health policy. 229 The health and safety of South Carolina's students
depend on it.
228. See Editorial, Overturn Veto of HIV Test Bill, THE STATE (Charleston, S.C.),
June 25, 2008, at 4, available at http://www.thestate.com/opinion/story/443005.html
(calling upon lawmakers to repeal the reporting requirement because it creates
dangerous assumptions that unreported children are HIV negative).
229. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600-04 (1977) (upholding New York's
prescription reporting because it did not deter people from accessing medicine,
extensive security measures protected the information, and it did not jeopardize
patients' reputations).
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